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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has ancient roots.1 Disputants have long viewed
arbitration as an attractive alternative to litigation.2 In the years
following the passage of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Law (FAA),
commentators trumpeted arbitration’s efficiencies to encourage
acceptance of the FAA.3 The judicial climate of 1925 lent an air of
relevance to these commentators’ arguments in favor of the new
federal regime,4 which put arbitration clauses on par with other
contract clauses.5 Before 1925, common-law precedent prohibited
courts from enforcing executory agreements to arbitrate against
parties who wished to revoke an arbitrator’s authority.6 This
common-law holdover badly weakened the institution of

1 See Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United
States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 242–43 (1928) (locating arbitration in the classics); Paul L.
Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 597 (1928) (“There was
a partially developed system of arbitration in Roman law, both during the classical period
and under Justinian.”).
2 See Jones, supra note 1, at 243 (“What is arbitration like? Gentle, fair . . . .” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cicero)).
3 See Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L.
REV. 265, 269 (1926) (enumerating three “evils which arbitration is intended to correct”: court
congestion, litigation expense, and judges’ lack of business expertise); Jones, supra note 1, at
240 (lamenting judges’ unfamiliarity with trade practices and the inexperience of juries
compared to arbitrators).
4 See Part II infra.
5 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2017) (making agreements to arbitrate irrevocable “save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”); see also H.R. REP. NO.
68-96, at 1 (1924) (“An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other
contracts, where it belongs.”).
6 See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1924) (“The federal courts—
like those of the states and of England—have, both in equity and at law, denied, in large
measure, the aid of their processes to those seeking to enforce executory agreements to
arbitrate disputes.”). This was true despite the courts’ professed misgivings. See, e.g.,
Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 292 (N.Y. 1921) (opinion of Cardozo, J.)
(“The ancient rule, with its exceptions and refinements, was criticized by many judges as
anomalous and unjust. It was followed with frequent protest to early precedents.”);
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983–84 (2d Cir. 1942)
(noting that lower courts, feeling bound to comply with precedent, nevertheless became
critical of judicial hostility to arbitration).
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arbitration—an institution that academics,7 legislators,8 and even
judges9 agreed would aid dispute resolution in the United States.
With the courts unwilling to reverse precedent, legislatures
stepped in to make arbitration agreements enforceable.10 The states
were first to act,11 but Congress followed soon after, passing the
FAA in 1925. Now it was the courts’ job to apply the law with
regularity so that the acclaimed benefits of arbitration would inure
to the American legal system.12 The body of law that then emerged
gave life to what the Supreme Court would call the “liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements.”13 This policy means that
courts liberally enforce arbitration agreements to advance the costsaving policy goals of the FAA.14
What began as a countermeasure to judges’ historical
hostility15—a countermeasure that aimed to place arbitration “upon
the same footing as other contracts”16—grew over the following
decades into a strong federal policy that judges invoked when they
enforced agreements to arbitrate.17 Even now, courts often use this
7 See Jones, supra note 1, at 240 (stating the purposes of arbitration as eliminating the
expense of litigation, saving delays in legal proceedings, improving business relations
between industry people and customers, establishing trade customs, and substituting the
decisions of practical business men for those of inexperienced juries); Cohen & Dayton, supra
note 3, at 265 (“The movement finds its origin in the unfortunate congestion of the courts and
in the delay, expense and technicality of litigation.”); see also Sayre, supra note 1, at 615
(“Business men want arbitration which gives them experts to pass upon the facts, which are
often far more important than questions of law involved in commercial suits.”).
8 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
9 See Jones, supra note 1, at 256 (noting that American courts believed “the policy of
arbitration was wise and should be encouraged” but that “it was the duty” of the legislature
to pass a law favoring enforcement).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 247–48 (observing that before 1920 several states had made agreements to
arbitrate irrevocable); see also id. at 261 (observing the trend from 1920 of adopting “a
uniform state statute where submission is irrevocable”).
12 See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir.
1942) (“In light of the clear intention of Congress, it is our obligation to shake off the old
judicial hostility to arbitration.”).
13 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
14 Id.
15 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“The need for the law arises from an anachronism
of our American law.”); Jones, supra note 1, at 256 (“In the early history of the United States
there was considerable objection to arbitration.”)
16 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
17 See, e.g., Collado v. J. & G. Transp., Inc., 820 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Federal
policy strongly favors enforcing arbitration agreements.” (internal citations omitted)); Banc
One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[O]nce a court determines
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policy to save costs, free up dockets, and call on expert decision
makers.18
But courts’ application of the federal policy favoring arbitration
has caused inefficiencies, encouraging the kind of spending and
delay that arbitration instead ought to prevent.19 These
inefficiencies crop up perennially in the context of arbitration
waiver. A party resisting arbitration based on the other party’s
alleged waiver must show that the waiving party acted as though it
intended to litigate, not arbitrate.20 This is true in arbitration
waiver as it is in any contract waiver situation.21 All circuits require
at least this showing, but most require more.22
Most circuits have ruled that a party resisting a motion to compel
arbitration must prove (1) that the movant acted inconsistently with
its right to arbitrate and (2) that the movant’s inconsistent acts
caused the nonmovant prejudice.23 Courts that maintain this rule
place the burden on the nonmovant to show prejudice.24 Even if the
party moving to compel arbitration has broadcasted its plans to
litigate through its overt acts, those acts may not amount to a
waiver absent a showing that those acts prejudiced the nonmoving

that an agreement to arbitrate exists, the court must pay careful attention to the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration and must resolve all ambiguities in favor of arbitration.”
(internal citations omitted)).
18 See Jones, supra note 1, at 240 (listing the purposes of arbitration).
19 See E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Const. Co. of Texas, 559 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding that a party’s delay in invoking arbitration caused the nonmovant to bear the type
of expenses that arbitration was designed to avoid).
20 See, e.g., Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 2007)
(finding that a party waived its arbitral rights where it acted inconsistently with the right to
arbitrate); St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prod. Co., 969 F.2d 585,
588 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The essential question is whether, based on the circumstances, the
alleged defaulting party has acted inconsistently with the right to arbitrate.”).
21 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:22 (4th ed.) (“Waiver, as an excuse for
nonperformance of a contract, is essentially a matter of intention.”).
22 See infra Part III.
23 See, e.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. Wi-Lan USA, Inc., 623 Fed. Appx. 568, 569 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“[W]aiver ‘may be found only when prejudice to the other party is demonstrated.’” (quoting
Thyssen, Inc. v. Calypso Shipping Corp., 310 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2002))); Joca-Roca Real
Estate, LLC v. Brennan, 772 F.3d 945, 948 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[M]ere delay in seeking
[arbitration] without some resultant prejudice is insufficient to ground a finding of conductbased waiver.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Creative Solutions Grp., Inc. v. Pentzer
Corp., 252 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2001))).
24 See Joca-Roca Real Estate, 772 F.3d at 948 (“The party advocating waiver has the
burden of demonstrating prejudice.”).
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party.25 Acts that would ordinarily show a party’s intent to litigate
include delaying before invoking its right to arbitrate, choosing a
litigation venue or removing to a different litigation venue,
undertaking preliminary motions practice, filing dispositive
motions, collaborating with the court and the other party in pretrial
meetings, or engaging in discovery.26
So the burden of prejudice may allow, and even encourage,
litigants to create the very costs that Congress introduced the FAA
to save. A party may use arbitration as a “plan B” as soon as its
litigation strategy has gone awry, or as soon as the party has won
some advantage through litigation that it might not have won in
arbitration. The burden of prejudice paves the way for a strategy
that Judge Posner has called, “[H]eads I win, tails you lose.”27
Given how litigants have manipulated the rules that require a
showing of prejudice, this Note advocates for a different rule: courts
should find that a party has waived its right to arbitrate when the
party undermines the purposes of the FAA by wastefully litigating
before moving to arbitrate. The Seventh Circuit has held that a
party’s decision to proceed with a suit in court raises a rebuttable
presumption that the party has waived its right to arbitrate.28 This
presumption has the virtue of eliminating the prejudice
requirement, but does not squarely address the problems of
duplicative litigation and gaming the system by trying two venues.
Instead, courts should adopt a rule that is both broader and
narrower than the Seventh Circuit’s presumption. It is true that a
bright-line presumption of waiver when parties fail to raise
arbitration as a defense has the benefit of clarity. However, the
trigger for this presumption (failure to raise an arbitration defense
in an answer) is too mechanical and may encourage courts to find

25 See, e.g., Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200, 208
(4th Cir. 2004) (requiring more than the legal expenses inherent in litigation to show
prejudice). For a full discussion of the activity that might lead a court to find waiver, see
Donald E. Frechette, Waiving the Right to Arbitrate by Participating in Litigation, 80 DEF.
COUNSEL J. 223 (2013).
26 See Frechette, supra note 25, at 224–229.
27 Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995).
28 Id. at 390; see also Lilly, supra note 145, at 109 . But see Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd.
v. Bombardier Recreational Prods., Inc., 660 F.3d 988, 995 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a
party does not waive its right to arbitrate by filing a motion to dismiss (citing Faulkenberg v.
CB Tax Franchise Sys., LP, 637 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2011))).
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waiver where the party’s failure was justified and the parties (and
society as a whole) might still save time and money by arbitrating.
Instead, courts should apply a two-tiered analysis in finding
arbitration waiver. Under the first tier, courts should automatically
find waiver if a party deliberately manipulates the judicial process
to gain a tactical advantage or gains an advantage it would not have
gained in arbitration. For example, a party might win a smokinggun document in a discovery dispute, which it would not have won
in arbitration’s less-probing fact-finding process. That would should
lead to automatic waiver.
Under the second, less-demanding tier, courts should rebuttably
presume waiver where a party duplicates the machinery of
arbitration by litigating in court. This rule would prevent most
duplicative litigation while allowing an equitable outlet for parties
that pursued litigation in good faith.29 A party’s good-faith decision
to litigate, rather than arbitrate, is a lesser evil than a deliberate
manipulation of the courts to gain a tactical advantage. But
invoking arbitration after extensive pretrial proceedings is still
wasteful and should raise a rebuttable presumption of waiver. 30
Part II of this Note traces the history of arbitration from its roots,
focusing on its development in the English common law and its
transfer to American courts. This survey will clarify the context in
which Congress passed the FAA in 1925, the challenges that
Congress sought to address, and the benefits that Congress hoped
to provide. Part II will show how courts readily adopted and applied
the FAA, but also how courts became overzealous in their
application of the FAA. Part III will discuss the problematic
overextension of the policy favoring arbitration in the arbitration
waiver context. It will examine the prevailing rule among circuits,
29 A case might arise where a party has not yet determined the scope of arbitrability for a
given issue, but they are running up against a statute of limitations. See infra note 183 and
accompanying text. Courts have also excused failure to invoke arbitration in a timely manner
when invocation would have been futile (because the law changed during the party’s delay),
see Chassen v. Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc., 836 F.3d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 2016) (excusing delay where
mortgagors’ initial motion would have failed before a change in law), and when some major
change occurred in the course of litigation that substantially altered the parties’ positions,
see United States v. Cyberonics, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 337, 350 (D. Mass. 2015) (no waiver
where party delayed to file motion to dismiss non-arbitrable claims).
30 See Gray Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 454 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A] party may not
use arbitration to manipulate the legal process and in that process waste scarce judicial
resources.”).
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under which a party resisting a motion to compel arbitration must
show that the movant’s actions caused it prejudice. Finally, Part IV
will advocate a two-tiered waiver rule that prevents duplicative
litigation and strategies that abuse courts’ ready enforcement of
arbitration, while also affording parties an equitable outlet.
II. THE FAA: HISTORY AND CONTEXT
Congress devised the FAA to address a judge-made problem. On
January 24, 1924, Representative George Scott Graham of
Pennsylvania, speaking on behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary, described “an anachronism of our American law” that had
created the need for the new legislation that he would shortly
propose: the FAA.31 The anachronistic law was judge-made; the
remedy would be legislative.
This Part discusses both the judicial problem and the legislative
solution. It examines the history of courts’ unwillingness to enforce
arbitration and legislators’ efforts to correct that unwillingness.
And it explains how, in response to legislators’ efforts, courts
erected an “edifice of [their] own creation.”32
A. THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL JEALOUSY

Representative Graham explained that English courts’
unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements had passed into
American law and embedded itself there.33 Attempting to explain
English courts’ refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate,
Representative Graham cited “the jealousy of the English courts for
their own jurisdiction.”34 He said that although American courts
had criticized the rule and its illogicality, the rule was too strongly
fixed for courts to overturn it without legislative permission.35
Representative Graham’s history was incomplete, but his
conclusion about American courts’ reluctance to change was apt.
The Second Circuit would later call his conjecture about judicial
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
33 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924).
34 Id. at 1.
35 Id. at 2.
31
32

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

7

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2019], Art. 9

778

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:771

jealously “quaint,” a product of legal minds manufacturing a reason
for a rule.36 Other commentators agreed that this jealousy rationale
was a myth.37 Like the Second Circuit,38 Professor Paul Sayre
emphasized that the doctrine of “judicial jealousy”39 gained judicial
acceptance without even a modicum of evidentiary support.40 The
doctrine first appeared in Kill v. Hollister (1746), 95 Eng. Rep. 532;
1 Wils. 129, without any citation of authority.41
The Senate Judiciary Committee also addressed courts’
unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements.42 But they
expanded on Representative Graham’s historical explanation for
this unwillingness43 by giving a comprehensive list of reasons: the
fear that extrajudicial tribunals lacked the power to give full
redress; the doubt that courts could compel an unwilling party to
arbitrate, denying the party its right to judicial hearing and
determination; courts’ jealousy and their fear of ouster; and the
weight of precedent.44
Rejecting the notion of judicial jealousy and fear of ouster as
baseless,45 Professor Sayre endorsed the procedural explanations of
courts’ unwillingness to compel arbitration. He traced arbitration’s
roots to the Classical period and suggested that arbitration came to
the common law through Ecclesiastical courts.46 Arbitration was

36 See Kulukundis Shipping Co., v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942)
(noting that awards under arbitration, as well as releases and covenants not to sue, were no
less an ouster than arbitration agreements, but courts willingly enforced them); see also
Jones, supra note 1, at 258 (“Furthermore the court is not robbed of its jurisdiction for an
award once made is enforceable through a judgement of the court.”).
37 See Sayre, supra note 1, at 610 (rejecting the notion of “contests of the courts of ancient
times for expansion of jurisdiction” (citations omitted)). See also, with respect to modern
courts, JULIUS H. COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 260 (1918) (“In our day,
there is little evidence of jealousy on the part of the courts over the disposition of controversy
by private tribunals.”).
38 See Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983 (“[T]he legal mind must assign some reason in order
to decide anything with spiritual quiet.”).
39 Sayre, supra note 1, at 609.
40 Id. at 610.
41 Id. at 604.
42 See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (noting the “very old law” that arbitration clauses
would not be enforced in equity or at law).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 2–3.
45 See Sayre, supra note 1, at 610 (“It is difficult to see the justice in attributing such
unworthy motives to the courts in their development of arbitration law . . . .”).
46 Id. at 597.
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foreign to Anglo-Saxon law at that time, and the King’s courts would
not have favorably entertained the idea when it appeared.47 After
all, the courts were both a source of revenue for the crown and a
vehicle for political consolidation.48 Arbitration was a purely private
matter with little structural support beyond the enforcement that
the common law would, or would not, offer.49 After the passage of
the Statute of Fines and Penalties in 1687,50 which capped at actual
damages the recovery for breach of an arbitration agreement, the
courts eventually held that they would only allow nominal
damages.51 What damage could a party suffer for the “high privilege
and great advantage” of the King’s courts?52 A later law authorized
parties to ask courts to make arbitration “irrevocable.”53 But given
English courts’ distaste for arbitration, that authorization had no
teeth.54
Judges’ aversion to arbitration likely stemmed from their desire
to give parties due process.55 English and American courts had tools
to secure testimony and subpoena witnesses, as well as external
guarantees of impartiality.56 To avoid depriving parties of these

Id. at 597–98.
See id. at 598 (“Perhaps the main purposes of the King’s justice were political and
financial, in consolidating and unifying the kingdom and in bringing fees into the royal
treasury.”). The idea that judges in England were unwilling to forfeit their fees featured in
the rhetorical toolbox of arbitration’s chief proponents. See, for example, Julius H. Cohen’s
preterition in a joint hearing before the House and Senate Judiciary: “Of course, some of the
justices have been unkind enough to their predecessors to say that there was a time when the
judges were paid according to the cases they acted upon and the fees they got. I do not want
to reflect on the judiciary in that way, although there is some historical basis for believing it.”
Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of
Disputes, 68th Cong. 1 (1924) (statement of Julius H. Cohen).
49 Sayre, supra note 1, at 598 (describing how “arbitration was entirely a matter of private
arrangement for which there was no authority except the personal authority of the parties to
the agreement”); Jones, supra note 1, at 245 (“The courts of law in England held that the
parties were at liberty to revoke the authority given to an arbiter, under the submission, at
any time before an award was made.”).
50 8 & 9 Will. 3 c. 11, § 8 (Eng.).
51 Sayre, supra note 1, at 604.
52 See id. at 604 (noting that “to recover damages because one had to try his case there
was a little more than the courts could understand”).
53 Id. at 605.
54 See id. (“[T]he act could not be used extensively, since the submission was still revocable
until a rule of court enforcing it had been obtained.”).
55 Id. at 611 (noting that arbitration lacks the usual means of securing an impartial
hearing).
56 Id.
47
48
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procedural rights, courts shied from enforcing executory
agreements to arbitrate.57 The risk of procedural deprivation ran
higher when the parties were on unequal bargaining terms58—a
concern that has not dissipated with time.59
Regardless of their reason for disfavoring arbitration, by 1924,
the courts’ distaste for arbitration had drawn attention at the
highest level of government in the United States.60 Both the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees acknowledged it in introducing
the FAA, and the Supreme Court noted it in the same year.61 Both
houses of Congress derided the “anachronism”62—the “ancient
rules”63—and they sought to place arbitration on par with other
agreements.64 The fruit of their labors was, of course, the FAA.
B. THE FAA’S PURPOSE

To assess contemporary courts’ application of the FAA, it is
useful to understand Congress’s goals in passing the Act. The
reports contemporary with the FAA’s consideration show the
57 Id. (describing the courts view that arbitration “involve[d] such a limitation upon the
parties’ fundamental rights . . . that the courts [would] not enforce [arbitration]”).
58 Id.; see also id. at 616 (noting that opponents of the FAA feared that small merchants
or customers might be coerced into arbitration agreements, depriving them of their day in
court).
59 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011) (favoring the FAA
over a California statute allowing courts to strike arbitration clauses for unconscionability,
including procedural unconscionability in light of unequal bargaining power); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32–33 (1991) (considering and rejecting the
argument that arbitration should not be enforced in ADEA contexts due to unequal
bargaining).
60 While England passed its distaste for arbitration to America through the common law,
Parliament anticipated Congress in reforming the distaste when it enacted statutes in 1833
and 1889 making written agreements to arbitrate irrevocable, except by leave of the court,
and expanding the procedural powers of arbitrators. See supra note 50.
61 See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1924) (emphasizing that
English and American courts, state and federal, had denied their aid in seeking to enforce
arbitration). The Bar, too, had evidently come around. See Jones, supra note 1, at 258 (noting
that lawyers, finding themselves in the capacity of legal advisers to the trade associations,
enjoyed the appreciation of clients who avoided the cost and delay of legal proceedings).
62 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
63 S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924).
64 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“An arbitration agreement is placed on the same
footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (“The record
made under the supervision of this society shows . . . the practical justice in the enforced
arbitration disputes where written agreements for that purpose have been voluntarily and
solemnly entered into.”).
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legislature’s objective: to correct judges’ reluctance to enforce
arbitration agreements so that arbitration agreements would bind
parties as effectively as any other freely made contract.
The reasons why Congress wanted to revitalize arbitration—to
save costs, alleviate docket clogs, and inject experts into disputes—
can guide courts’ interpretation and application of the FAA. These
three purposes can be found in two principal places: the language of
the congressional reports contemporaneous with the Act’s
consideration, and the structure of the Act itself.
1. The Congressional Reports
The reports from the House and Senate show that the two
chambers were of one mind regarding the need for legislative action
to advance the cause of arbitration.65 As explained above, their
understandings of the relevant history were somewhat different,
but the House’s and Senate’s hopes for the Act were the same.66 The
law was passed in a climate of judicial hostility to arbitration, which
the legislature hoped to squelch.67
Both chambers predicted that the new law would reduce the
expense of litigation and mitigate the delays that had come to
characterize the courts, and both chambers emphasized the
advantage of arbitrators’ business expertise.68 The House Report
described arbitration as a way of “reducing technicality, delay, and
expense to a minimum.”69 A party willing to submit a dispute to
arbitration would not be subject to the “delay and cost of
litigation.”70 The House deemed the Act’s passage to be “practically
appropriate . . . at this time when there is so much agitation against
the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely
Compare H.R. REP. NO. 68-96 (1924) with S. REP. NO. 68-536 (1924).
One commentator has observed that, due to the Bar Association’s several years of
lobbying before Congress in favor of uniform federal procedure, the members of Congress
were probably familiar with problems like court clogs and delays. IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING
JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA 170 (2013).
67 See
IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION—
NATIONALIZATION—INTERNATIONALIZATION 105 (1992) (“Perhaps the most important single
factor in understanding congressional intention respecting the [FAA] is the legal background
against which the [FAA] was presented to Congress.”).
68 Cf. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011) (noting Congress’s
original purpose for the FAA to remediate the expense and delay of litigation).
69 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
70 Id.
65
66
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eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements
are made valid and enforceable.”71
The Senate reiterated the House’s position. The Senate Judiciary
Committee, reporting on the Act, observed that
arrangements for avoiding the delay and expense of
litigation and referring a dispute to friends or neutral
persons are a natural practice of which traces may be
found in any state of society.’ The desire to avoid the
delay and expense of litigation persists. The desire
grows with time and as delays and expenses increase.72
The committee also noted “a brief résumé” from the New York
Times describing the successes of the Arbitration Society of
America:
In contrast with the long time required by the courts
with their congested calendars to settle a dispute, the
records of the society show that the average arbitration
required but a single hearing, and occupied but a few
hours of the time of disputants, counsel, and witnesses.
The cost to disputants was said to be trifling as
compared with the cost of litigation.73
Both houses were preoccupied with the delay and expense of
litigation, and their preoccupation was a sign of the times. Much of
the delay and expense that Congress targeted with the FAA arose
from the civil procedural patchwork of the early twentieth century.74
Under the Conformity Act of 1872, federal courts were supposed to
“conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms
and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the
courts of record of the State within which such circuit or district
courts are held.”75 This rule of conformity meant that judges and
lawyers had to tackle burdensome, case-by-case determinations
Id.
S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924).
73 Id. (quoting N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1924).
74 See SZALAI, supra note 66, at 167 (describing state-by-state variations).
75 Id. (quoting 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1002 (3d ed. 1998)).
71
72
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about procedural rules.76 The FAA was part of a broader effort to
streamline and reform procedure in federal courts.77 While that
effort was not fully realized until 1938 when the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure took effect,78 the FAA’s passage in 1925 was a major
event in this procedure-focused era.79
2. The Structure of the Act Itself
The core operative provision of the Arbitration Act is § 2.80
Section 2 provides that “an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”81
In arguing against a broad construction of the FAA, Ian MacNeil
describes the law as “an unquestionably integrated, unitary statute,
consisting of core provisions and provisions supplementing them.” 82
MacNeil’s structural description finds support in history: Congress
lifted the key language in the statute—that written agreements to
arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable”83—directly
from the relatively recent New York Arbitration Law of 1920.84
MacNeil reasons that Congress intended to create an integral
statute, like New York’s, organized around the enforceability
provision.85 All other provisions in both the FAA and the New York

76 See id. at 169 (“[I]t was often recognized that [] a [uniform federal court procedure] law
would simplify procedure and alleviate the frustrations and costs of the confusing, hypertechnical, uncertain procedure existing in federal courts at the time.”).
77 See id. at 168 (“Dissatisfaction with the existing and confusing procedures in federal
court gave rise to a movement to reform federal court procedure.”).
78 Id. at 169 (discussing the history of efforts to unify federal court procedure).
79 See id. at 170 (“All these reforms can be understood as related to the same overall push
for dealing with the ‘law’s delays’ and improving the administration of justice.”).
80 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
81 Id.
82 MACNEIL, supra note 67, at 105–06. MacNeil argues that the FAA was a procedural
remedy designed for federal courts, not state courts. While this Note argues that courts have
extended the liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration agreements too far in the arbitration
waiver context, the larger, though related, question of whether the FAA applies to state courts
is beyond the scope of this discussion.
83 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
84 MACNEIL, supra note 67, at 106.
85 Id. at 106–07.
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law depended on the validity, irrevocability, and enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate.
The FAA’s proponents used language that reinforced § 2’s
centrality. In the House, the Judiciary Committee declared that the
“purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible agreements for
arbitration.”86 And the Senate Judiciary Committee described “the
bill . . . to make valid and enforceable written provisions or
agreements for arbitration.”87 The Senate Judiciary Committee did
not mince words when describing the substance of the law: “The
purpose of the bill is clearly set forth in section 2.”88
Taken together, the FAA’s jurisprudential context, the
congressional reports contemporaneous with its passage, and the
centrality of § 2 together yield a narrative of congressional purpose.
Congress introduced and passed the FAA in response to the sticky
problem of judges’ unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements.
It did so to cut down on the expense and delay of arbitration and to
inject the judgment of an expert arbitrator into complex commercial
disputes. To do all of that, Congress produced § 2, which placed
arbitration agreements on par with other contracts.89 Absent from
the Act’s history and passage was an explicit endorsement of strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration. But this strong policy soon
surfaced in the courts as the doctrinal bridge between the Act and
its relentless application.
C. THE FAA IN THE COURTS

The staunchest critics of the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration argue that judges created it.90 They argue that this
policy is divorced from the Act’s history and from Congress’s

H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 1 (1924).
88 Id. at 2.
89 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)
(describing § 2 as the “Act’s centerpiece provision”).
90 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (describing FAA jurisprudence as an edifice of the Court’s own creation); Imre
Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History, 2016 J.
DISP. RESOL. 115, 117 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court has erred in extending the
FAA to disputes beyond a limited, modest system of private dispute resolution).
86
87
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designs.91 And they often argue against the Court’s expansive
reading of the FAA from a federalist perspective, suggesting that
the Court should never have extended the FAA to cover disputes in
state courts.92
This Note does not grapple with the Supreme Court’s extension
of the FAA to state court disputes or its application in areas beyond
commercial disputes. But courts’ role in the establishment of a
strong federal policy favoring arbitration is clear.93 American
courts, which had long followed English precedent in refusing to
enforce arbitration agreements,94 faithfully implemented the Act
that Congress had passed to free them from that precedent, paving
the way to a more effective domestic arbitration regime.95 The
federal policy favoring arbitration bridged Congress’s driving
purposes for the Act (cost savings, clearing dockets, and expertise)
with its application in trial courts.
However, courts have defied Congress’s purposes by extending
the federal policy to litigation contexts where invoking the rule
undermines the core purposes of the FAA. A brief examination of
the birth and development of the federal policy favoring arbitration
shows that courts—first the circuits and eventually the Supreme
Court—had congressional purpose in mind when they invoked the
policy. But this conscientiousness dissolved in the arbitration
waiver context, as courts invoked the strong federal policy to justify
wasteful rules requiring prejudice as an element of waiver.96

91 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 128 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court has been “[p]laying ostrich” to the substantial history
behind the employment amendment of § 1 of the FAA); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283 (“Yet,
over the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional
intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act . . . .”); SZALAI, supra note 66, at 117;
MACNEIL, supra note 67, at 146 (noting that “not one thing in the legislative history” suggests
that Congress intended the FAA to apply in state courts).
92 See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“As applied in state courts,
however, the effect of a broad formulation of § 2 is more troublesome.”); MACNEIL, supra note
67, at 135; SZALAI, supra note 66, at 117.
93 See supra note 90.
94 See supra Part II.A.
95 Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942) (“In
the light of the clear intention of Congress, it is our obligation to shake off the old judicial
hostility to arbitration.”).
96 See infra Part III.
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1. The Edifice of Arbitration Policy
The Supreme Court first invoked the policy favoring arbitration
in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.97 An Alabama contractor (Mercury) sued in district court to
compel arbitration in its dispute with a North Carolina hospital
(Moses H. Cone).98 The district court stayed federal proceedings
pending resolution of concurrent state court claims.99 Mercury
appealed the stay, arguing that the district court should have
compelled arbitration, and the Fourth Circuit agreed.100 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the district
court should have stayed the federal claims pending resolution of
the state court claims or whether it should instead have compelled
arbitration.101
The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in refusing
to compel arbitration.102 Among other factors weighing in favor of
arbitration, the Court described a liberal federal policy in favor of
arbitration,103 which the Court located in § 2, the FAA’s enforcement
provision.104 The Court cited “Congress’s clear intent . . . to move the
parties . . . into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.”105 It
also concluded that “[§] 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”106 And the court
noted that “the courts of appeals have since consistently concluded
that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”107
By the time the Court was writing, roughly fifty-eight years after
the FAA’s enactment, a number of circuits had indeed developed a
pro-arbitration policy.108 But as Moses H. Cone plainly shows by its
97 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (describing
and applying “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” based on § 2 of the
FAA).
98 Id. at 4, 7.
99 Id. at 8.
100 Id. at 4.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 29.
103 Id. at 24.
104 Id. (“Section 2 is the primary substantive provision of the Act . . . .”). For a discussion of
the centrality of this provision, see Part II.B above.
105 Id. at 22.
106 Id. at 24.
107 Id.
108 See id. at 25 n.31 (collecting cases).
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strange reliance on circuit court holdings for support, this policy was
not the legacy of a seminal, post-FAA Supreme Court decision. Its
development was a disorderly mishmash of jurisprudence, a true
legacy of common law.
Many courts in the mid-twentieth century invoked the federal
policy favoring arbitration, even if they did not use those words
exactly. In 1968, the First Circuit noted the “vigorous policy
favoring arbitration.”109 Not long after—but before Moses H. Cone—
the Third Circuit described arbitration as a “favored policy for the
resolution of disputes.”110 In the Fourth Circuit, the policy had
surfaced by 1971.111 The Ninth Circuit described “the strong federal
policy supporting international arbitration agreements” in a 1978
case.112 And in the Eleventh Circuit, “any party arguing waiver of
arbitration [bore] a heavy burden of proof” in 1978.113
Post-Moses H. Cone courts tended to cite the Supreme Court to
support their endorsement of the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration.114 But before Moses H. Cone, the courts had to look
elsewhere. By and large, the circuits drew support for the policy
favoring arbitration from a common source: the Second Circuit’s
decisions in Kulukundis and Carcich.115
Kulukundis was the earliest case to explicitly describe the
federal policy favoring arbitration.116 Decided 15 years after the
FAA’s enactment, Kulukundis demonstrated a new, pro-arbitration

109 Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368, 371 (1st Cir. 1968) (citing Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967) and Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959)).
110 Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777, 783 (3d Cir. 1975), abrogated by
Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1988).
111 See Carolina Throwing Co. v. S & E Novelty Corp., 442 F.2d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 1971)
(describing the “modern rule” as a “liberal national policy favoring arbitration”).
112 Shinto Shipping Co. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co., 572 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing
Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968)).
113 Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1025 (11th Cir. 1982)
abrogated by Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
114 See, e.g., Shinto Shipping at 1330.
115 See, e.g., Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 1120 n.4 (8th
Cir. 2011) (“We can trace the origins of our prejudice requirement to Carcich v. Rederi A/B
Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1968).”); see also Gavlik Construction Co. v. H.F. Campbell
Co., 526 F.2d 777, 783 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing Carcich); Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368, 371
(1st Cir. 1968) (citing Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d
Cir. 1959)).
116 Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (1942).
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judicial posture and answered Congress’s call to end American
courts’ historical unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements.
Kulukundis involved a suit in admiralty between two companies
to a maritime contract. One issue before the court was whether one
party had waived its right to arbitrate.117 The party resisting
arbitration argued that the party seeking arbitration had waived its
right to arbitrate because the party seeking arbitration had
“contested the existence of the [contract] which contained” the
arbitration clause.118 The Second Circuit rejected this argument and
sent the case to arbitration.119 The Second Circuit was aware of the
history of arbitration and acknowledged the judicial hostility to
arbitration that American courts had inherited through the
common law.120 The court noted that the FAA was a countermeasure
to this historical hostility,121 and acknowledged the duty of the
courts to abide by Congress’s efforts to rescue the courts from the
old hostility towards arbitration.122 The court fulfilled its duty by
abandoning the English precedent and moving forward with a “new
orientation”123—one that did not “narrowly construe[]” arbitration
agreements.124
Duly applying this new orientation, the Second Circuit held that
the defendant did not waive its arbitral rights merely because it
may have breached the contract.125 Even so, the court said in dicta
that a plaintiff that sued under a contract could not, after a long
delay, ask the court to stay proceedings pending arbitration.126
“Within limits, much might perhaps be said for such a holding, on
the ground that a party should not thus first set in motion judicial

Id. at 989 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012)).
Id. at 988.
119 See id. (“We see no reason why a respondent should be precluded from [] pleading in the
alternative.”).
120 See id. at 982 (“In considering these contentions in the light of the precedents, it is
necessary to take into account the history of the judicial attitude towards arbitration . . . .”).
121 See id. at 985 (“The purpose of that Act was deliberately to alter the judicial atmosphere
previously existing.”).
122 Id. (“In the light of the clear intention of Congress, it is our obligation to shake off the
old judicial hostility to arbitration.”).
123 Id. at 985.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 989 (citing Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 70 F.2d
297 (2d Cir. 1934)).
126 Id.
117
118
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proceedings and then arrest them.”127 The circuit used one notable
example of improper conduct—“if the plaintiff wants to avail
himself of provision remedies not available in aid of the
arbitration.”128 But that was not the case in Kulukundis, so the
court found no waiver: “[T]he defendant . . . was not in default
within the meaning of the proviso in Section 3 [of the FAA].”129
By 1968, the Second Circuit had explicitly recognized “an
overriding federal policy favoring arbitration” in Carcich.130 The
circuit relied on that policy in justifying a no-waiver finding in a
case where a defendant (Cunard) had moved to arbitrate.131 The
circuit’s language solidified the reasoning that other courts have
followed to this day:
Appellees argue that Cunard should have moved earlier
for the stay, and that it delayed for two years in order
to be ‘in on’ the longshoreman's suit. They insist that
Cunard has acted inconsistently—it cannot ‘have it both
ways.’ But this argument misses the mark. It is not
‘inconsistency,’ but the presence or absence of prejudice
which is determinative of the issue . . . . [I]t may appear
that it is inconsistent for a party to participate in a
lawsuit for breach of a contract, and later to ask the
court to stay that litigation pending arbitration. Yet the
law is clear that such participation, standing alone,
does not constitute a waiver . . . , for there is an
overriding federal policy favoring arbitration. Waiver,
therefore, is not to be lightly inferred, and mere delay
in seeking a stay of the proceedings without some
resultant prejudice to a party . . . cannot carry the
day.132

Id.
Id. at 989 n.40.
129 Id. at 989 (alteration added). Section 3 of the FAA allows courts to grant a stay of
litigation pending arbitration, provided the party moving for arbitration is not “in default.”
See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012).
130 Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968).
131 Id. (noting the overriding federal policy favoring arbitration).
132 Id. at 696 (emphasis added) (citing Kulukundis).
127
128
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Carcich is therefore an early example of a court’s reconciling the
FAA with a party’s unwillingness to arbitrate. The clash between
the FAA’s enforcement regime and a party’s desire to arbitrate
makes sense. The policy favoring arbitration and discussions of
arbitration waiver are natural companions. When considering a
waiver allegation, courts must determine whether equity would
allow arbitration to take place. Congress’s elevation of arbitration
agreements to a status equivalent to that of other agreements
meant that courts were required to give due weight to freely
contracted arbitration clauses.
2. Policy and Prejudice
The Second Circuit’s decision in Carcich to require prejudice,
rather than to find waiver based on a party’s acts inconsistent with
the right to arbitrate, influenced the eventual development of
arbitration waiver rules among the circuits. When the Second
Circuit refused to find waiver absent prejudice to the party resisting
arbitration, it detached the federal policy favoring arbitration from
the FAA’s core purposes of saving costs, freeing up dockets, and
injecting experts into disputes.
Simple waiver and prejudice are critically different analyses.
Waiver asks whether a party that wants to arbitrate has acted
inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Courts that focus on
waiver (without asking about prejudice to the to the other party)
are scrutinizing the party that is most likely to duplicate costs: the
moving party. Asking whether those acts caused the nonmoving
party prejudice shifts a court’s focus from the movant’s actions to
the effects of those actions. This shift is misguided because a party
can substantially waste the court’s resources without obviously
prejudicing its opposing party.133 A party can also “test the waters”
in court without inflicting obvious prejudice. This shift of focus from
the acts of the movant to the effects of those acts on the nonmovant
came with the federal policy in favor of arbitration.134
133 See Gray Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 454 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]n addition to
addressing . . . whether the non-moving party suffers prejudice . . . , a court, by finding that
there has been a waiver . . . effectuates the principle that a party may not use arbitration to
manipulate the legal process and in that process waste scarce judicial resources.”).
134 Carcich, 389 F.2d at 696 (“Yet the law is clear that such participation, standing alone,
does not constitute a waiver . . . , for there is an overriding federal policy favoring
arbitration.”).
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The natural place for the courts to turn would have been to the
principles of equity. Indeed, that seems to have been the Second
Circuit’s impulse in Kulukundis when it said that “a party should
not thus first set in motion judicial proceedings and then arrest
them.”135 Later courts have similarly taken up equitable principles
to determine whether arbitration has been waived when they have
discussed issues like whether a party has acted inconsistently with
its right to arbitrate, or whether it has manifested an intention
contrary to its right to arbitrate.136 That analysis is consistent with
common-law waiver.137
But in the context of arbitration waiver, courts have given
greater weight to arbitration clauses than the common-law
principles of equity demand. The majority of circuits have required
not only that a party manifest an intention contrary to its right to
arbitrate, but, further, that the party’s efforts in litigation are
prejudicial to its adversary.138 The party resisting arbitration often
bears the burden of proving that prejudice.139
This requirement of prejudice shows a clear preference for
arbitration, but it is not entirely consistent with Congress’s hopes
for the FAA.140 A rule requiring prejudice to find waiver is a step too
far. This rule may result in a situation where a party is asked to
participate in litigation and spends considerable time and money
doing so but must still arbitrate because it cannot prove sufficient
prejudice. In Carcich, the court would not find waiver with mere
delay, but it recognized the inequity of letting a party “have it both
ways.”141 But circuits that require prejudice do, in fact, allow parties
to have it both ways.

Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 989 (2d Cir. 1942).
See infra Part III.
137 See 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:28 (4th ed. 2018) (West) (“[A] true waiver, implied
from a party’s conduct, is dependent solely on what the party charged with waiver intends to
do, and there is no need to show reliance by the party asserting or claiming the waiver.”).
138 See, e.g., Thyssen, Inc. v. Calypso Shipping Corp., 310 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The
key to a waiver analysis is prejudice.”); see also infra Part III.
139 See, e.g., Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Health Plan, 683 F.3d 577, 586 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The
heavy burden of showing default lies with the party opposing arbitration.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Forrester v. Penn Lyon Homes, Inc., 553 F.3d 340, 343 (4th Cir.
2009))).
140 See supra Part II.B.
141 Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968).
135
136
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III. THE CIRCUIT VIEWS ON PREJUDICE
Because the Supreme Court has not weighed in on whether a
showing of prejudice is required to prove that a party has waived
arbitration,142 this discussion primarily focuses on the status of
prejudice in the circuits. Based on the enduring strong federal policy
favoring arbitration,143 the prevailing rule in the circuits is that
courts must determine whether there has been prejudice before
finding arbitration waiver.144 There are three exceptions—the
Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits145—and the First Circuit
requirement of prejudice is “tame at best.”146 A circuit split persists.
A brief survey of the circuits’ prejudice rules shows a
jurisprudential patchwork. Professor Thomas J. Lilly has organized
this patchwork into categories based on the degree of prejudice that
circuits require before finding waiver: circuits that impose a “heavy
burden” to show prejudice; the First Circuit’s “modicum of
prejudice” standard; circuits between a “modicum” standard and a
“heavy burden” standard; and circuits that require no showing of
prejudice at all.147 This Note roughly follows Professor Lilly’s
organization but reorganizes the circuits into descending degrees of
prejudicial requirements and adds decisions that post-date his 2013
work.

142 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in one Eleventh Circuit case, see Stok & Assocs.,
P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 562 U.S. 1215 (2011), but the parties agreed to dismiss the case. See
563 U.S. 1029 (2011).
143 See Lilly, supra note 28, at 102 (“Those circuits that require a showing of prejudice
before there can be a finding of waiver of the right to arbitrate state they do so because of the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration.”).
144 See, e.g., MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding no
waiver, despite the movant’s filing three separate actions, delaying six months between the
time of the first action and invoking arbitration, and filing more than 50 motions, responses,
and other procedural maneuvers).
145 See Thomas J. Lilly, Jr., Participation in Litigation as a Waiver of the Contractual Right
to Arbitrate: Toward a Unified Theory, 92 NEB. L. REV. 86, 107 (2013) (describing these as
circuits that do not require prejudice).
146 Joca-Roca Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan, 772 F.3d 945, 949 (1st Cir. 2014).
147 See Lilly, supra note 145, at 86.
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A. PREJUDICE CIRCUITS

Professor Lilly designated the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth circuits
as imposing a heavy burden.148 The Fourth Circuit’s most strenuous
requirement of “actual prejudice” still stands as the high
watermark.149 The nonmoving hospital in Wheeling Hospital, Inc. v.
Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc., a 2012 Fourth Circuit
case, had to respond to two dispositive motions, participate in oral
argument, and spend $250,000 in legal fees.150 Even so, the circuit
concluded that “the hospital plaintiffs [] failed to meet their burden
of showing [] prejudice.”151 The costs that the hospital suffered in
Wheeling were exactly the kinds of costs that arbitration is supposed
to save. The Fourth Circuit shows no sign of relenting from this
heavy burden, which undermines the cost-saving orientation of the
FAA.152
The strong presumption persists in the Fifth Circuit too,153
though at least one case indicates that it may be wavering.154 Older
Fifth Circuit rules required substantial prejudice before finding
that arbitration had been waived. In Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy
International, AG, for example, the court found no waiver where the
moving party “waited almost eight months before moving [for a
stay] pending arbitration, and, in the meantime, participated in

Id. at 103.
See Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc., 683 F.3d 577,
588 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e must determine whether the hospital plaintiffs suffered actual
prejudice . . . .”).
150 Id. at 583.
151 Id. at 591.
152 See also Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200, 208
(4th Cir. 2004) (“With regard to pre-trial litigation expenses, we note that at least one circuit
has concluded that incurring the legal expenses inherent in litigation is, without more,
‘insufficient evidence of prejudice to justify a finding of waiver.’” (citing PPG Indus., Inc. v.
Webster Auto Parts, Inc., 128 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1997))).
153 See Joseph Chris Pers. Servs. Inc. v. Rossi, 249 F. App’x 988, 990 (5th Cir. 2007)
(adopting the presumption).
154 See Nicholas v. KBR, Inc., 565 F.3d 904, 908 (5th Cir. 2009) (requiring a showing of
prejudice, unlike the Seventh Circuit, but finding that “the act of a plaintiff filing suit without
asserting an arbitration clause constitutes substantial invocation of the judicial process,
unless an exception applies”). An older standard in the Fifth Circuit, like the Fourth, showed
a much lower tolerance for acts inconsistent with the right to arbitrate than did its later
opinions. See Burton-Dixie Corp. v. Timothy McCarthy Const. Co., 436 F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir.
1971) (“Any conduct of the parties inconsistent with the notion that they treated the
arbitration provision in effect . . . may amount to a waiver.”).
148
149
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discovery.”155 The Tenneco Resins court also rejected as indicative of
prejudice the nonmoving party’s “time and expensive of preparing
for trial.”156 But the Fifth Circuit may be reevaluating the wasteful
prejudice rule. In a more recent case, “the act of a plaintiff filing suit
without asserting an arbitration clause constitute[d] a substantial
invocation of the judicial process.”157 This language shows at least
an awareness of the wastefulness of moving to arbitrate after
invoking the judicial process.
Another circuit, the Ninth, recognizes the strong federal policy
and the heavy burden on the party resisting arbitration.158 It
requires prejudice in the form of financial costs, duplicitous
litigation, or an advantage won from litigation that could not be
achieved in arbitration.159 Still, recognizing that acts inconsistent
with an arbitral right can cause duplicative costs,160 the Ninth
Circuit recently found arbitration waiver where seventeen months
led to significant pretrial practice.161 As in the Fifth Circuit, the
burden of prejudice in the Ninth Circuit is heavy but may lighten in
the future.
The next group of circuits are those that require prejudice before
finding that arbitration has been waived, but they do not
necessarily require a “heavy burden”—that is, a clear showing of
time and money spent in litigation. This Note has already discussed
the invocation of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration in the
Second Circuit, and noted that wherever that policy rears its head,
the burden of prejudice on the party resisting arbitration will likely
follow.162 In the Second Circuit, the prejudice burden is alive and

Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int’l, AG, 770 F.2d 416, 420 (1985).
Id. at 421. In part, the court in that case found no waiver because the moving party had
moved to dismiss the action from the outset “because the dispute was covered by a valid and
enforceable arbitration clause.” Id. at 420.
157 See Nicholas v. KBR, 565 F.3d at 908.
158 Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2016).
159 Id. 1126–27.
160 Id. at 1127 (“When a party has expended considerable time and money due to the
opposing party's failure to timely move for arbitration and is then deprived of the benefits for
which it has paid by a belated motion to compel, the party is indeed prejudiced.”).
161 Id. at 1127–28.
162 See supra Part II.
155
156
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well.163 The Sixth,164 Eighth,165 and Eleventh166 Circuits have
similar standards to that of the Second. Courts in these circuits
require prejudice, but parties do not bear the heavy, dollars-andcents burden that parties bear in the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits.
The Third Circuit has developed its own standard. There, a court
may refuse to enforce an agreement to arbitrate where the movant
has acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate, and the court
will not hesitate to find waiver where there is prejudice.167 This rule
is similar to the two-tier rule that I suggest. The Third Circuit gives
district courts some discretion where a party has acted
inconsistently with its right to arbitrate before moving to
arbitrate.168 This makes sense. A party might have good reason not
to move to arbitrate right away. There may be some doubt about the
arbitrability of the claim, for example. But where the nonmoving
party show prejudice, the circuit “will not hesitate to hold that the
right to arbitrate has been waived.”169 This also makes sense.
163 LG Elec., Inc. v. Wi-Lan USA, Inc., 623 F. App’x 568, 569 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[W]aiver ‘may
be found only when prejudice to other party is demonstrated.’” (quoting Thyssen, Inc. v.
Calypso Shipping Corp., 310 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2002)); Etransmedia Tech., Inc. v.
Nephrology Assocs., P.C., No. 1:11–CV–1042, 2013 WL 1105440, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18,
2013) (citing factors, including proof of prejudice, from La. Stadium & Exposition Dist. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 626 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2010)).
164 See, e.g., Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Am., 610 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2010)
(holding that a party may waive its arbitral rights by engaging in two courses of conduct: (1)
acting inconsistently with the right to arbitrate and (2) causing prejudice by its delay in
invoking arbitration); see also Shy v. Navistar Int’l Corp, 781 F.3d 820, 828 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“Both inconsistency and actual prejudice are required, and neither is present here.”).
165 In 2011, the Eighth Circuit noted the “controversial” nature of the prejudice issue.
Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2011). The
circuit applied the prejudice burden but said that the question whether inconsistent acts
amounted to prejudice should be determined on a case-by-case basis, citing the Seventh
Circuit for the tenuousness of its prejudice requirement. Id. at 1119.
166 See, e.g., Grigsby & Assocs., Inc. v. M Sec. Inv., 635 F. App’x 728, 731–33 (11th Cir.
2015) (applying the strong federal policy and finding no waiver despite 10 years’ delay,
because three of the four lawsuits movant filed in that time were insubstantial, and the
movant’s malpractice suit against its former counsel was irrelevant); Garcia v. Wachovia
Corp., 699 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012) (requiring prejudice but finding waiver where
parties served and answered interrogatories, produced approximately 900,000 pages of
discovery documents, and took approximately 20 depositions).
167 In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 700 F.3d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 2012).
168 See id. at 117 (“A court may, however, refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement where
a party has acted inconsistently with the right to arbitrate . . . .”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
169 Id.
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Prejudice is a bellwether of wasteful litigation. If one party has
litigated to the point that the other party has suffered costs in time,
energy, or prejudice to their legal position, that is a strong sign that
the moving party has abused the alternative venue system. The
Third Circuit considers a handful of factors from its opinion in
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992) to
determine whether a party has suffered prejudice.170 Notably, the
Third Circuit standard aligns closely with that of the Seventh
Circuit and its presumptive waiver rule, which reflects a drift from
its earlier position between the heavy burden circuits and the First
Circuit’s modicum standard.171
The First Circuit’s prejudice requirement is “tame at best.”172 In
this, it is like the Third Circuit; both circuits will find waiver with
very little prejudice at all. Also like the Third, the First Circuit
applies a “salmagundi of factors, including: the length of the delay,
the extent to which the party seeking to invoke arbitration has
participated in the litigation, the quantum of discovery and other
litigation-related activities that have already taken place, the
proximity of the arbitration demand to an anticipated trial date,
and the extent to which the party opposing arbitration would be
prejudiced.”173
While it may be premature to tease out a trend from such a
pandemonium of circuit jurisprudence, there does seem to be some
shift in recent years towards greater vigilance over acts inconsistent
with the right to arbitrate. This is clear both from the cracks in the
foundation of the heavy-burden circuits—like the Fifth and Ninth—
and in the willingness of circuits like the Eighth to acknowledge the
danger in finding no waiver where parties have engaged in
duplicative litigation. This shift towards no-prejudice approaches
the standard in the Seventh Circuit, first expounded in St. Mary's
Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Production
Co., 969 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1992).

170 In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers, 700 F.3d at 117. For a full discussion of the factors
that courts consider in determining waiver, see Donald E. Frechette, Waiving the Right to
Arbitrate by Participating in Litigation, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 223, 224–28 (2013).
171 See Lilly, supra note 145, at 107.
172 Joca-Roca Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan, 772 F.3d 945, 949 (1st Cir. 2014).
173 Id. at 948.
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B. NO-PREJUDICE CIRCUITS

The Seventh Circuit holds that courts “may find waiver absent
prejudice,” and that the waiver inquiry is one that depends on the
totality of the circumstances.174 The circuit noted in St. Mary’s that
its conclusion was not inconsistent with the strong federal policy
favoring arbitration.175 While Congress intended to put arbitration
agreements on the same footing as other contracts,176 “the federal
policy embodied in the Arbitration Act is a policy favoring
enforcement of contracts, not a preference for arbitration over
litigation.”177 While the history and context in which Congress
enacted the FAA to some extent do seem to suggest a preference for
arbitration, owing to the benefits of speedy resolution and the
expertise of an arbitrator, the rule that the Seventh Circuit reached
in St. Mary’s more closely aligns with the spirit of Congress’s
preference—cost savings and efficiency.
In its later opinions, the Seventh Circuit spelled out the
implications of its no-prejudice rule. In Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc.
v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., the Seventh Circuit took the next step,
holding that an election to proceed before a nonarbitral tribunal for
the resolution of a contractual dispute is a presumptive waiver of
the right to arbitrate.178 The circuit noted that the principal treatise
on arbitration supports its rule179 and that in ordinary contract law,
a waiver is normally effective without proof of consideration or
detrimental reliance.180 The court reasoned that an arbitration
clause gives a party an alternative choice, but “the intention behind
such clauses, and the reason for judicial enforcement of them, are
174 See St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prod. Co., 969 F.2d 585,
590 (7th Cir. 1992) (“While none of our cases have stated explicitly that a court may find
waiver absent prejudice, that principle is implicit in our repeated emphasis that waiver
depends on all the circumstances in a particular case rather than on any rigid rules and that
prejudice is but one relevant circumstance to consider in determining whether a party has
waived its right to arbitrate.”).
175 Id.
176 Id. (quoting Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).
177 Id.
178 Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995).
179 Id. (citing 2 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT § 21.3.3 (1994)).
180 Id. (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (2d ed. 1990); 3A ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 753 (1960)).
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not to allow or encourage the parties to proceed, either
simultaneously or sequentially, in multiple forums.”181
However, the Seventh Circuit also noted some exceptions. Judge
Posner explained that situations might arise where invocation of
the judicial process does not signify an intention to proceed in a
court to the exclusion of arbitration.182 A party might have doubts
about arbitrability but face the prospect of a statute of limitations
running; it might sue where some issues are arbitrable and others
are not; or some unexpected development might arise in discovery
that justifies a resort to arbitration.183 Other courts have observed
that a party might sue “solely to obtain a threshold declaration as
to whether a valid arbitration agreement existed,” or “to obtain
injunctive relief pending arbitration.”184
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
In upholding the federal policy favoring arbitration, the courts
were doing their part to advance the same goals that Congress had
when it passed the FAA. It stands to reason, then, that courts
should enforce arbitration when doing so is consistent with the goals
of the FAA—cost savings, alleviating court clogs, and introducing
an expert arbitrator. But when a rule favoring arbitration
duplicates costs or contributes to delays in adjudication, courts
should decline to invoke the federal policy favoring arbitration.
Without the efficiency benefits, the federal policy favoring
arbitration is meaningless and counterproductive.
Of the prevailing rules, the Seventh Circuit’s most aggressively
enforces the efficiency-related purposes of the FAA. Congress
introduced the FAA to save on costs of litigation, alleviate court
clogs, and utilize an expert arbitrator in disputes. Allowing parties
to proceed with litigation before they invoke their arbitral rights
poses a serious threat of duplicative litigation costs and clogs court
dockets. So the prevailing rule among the circuits, which calls for a
showing of at least some prejudice to the nonmovant before finding

Id.
Id. (“[I]t is easy to imagine situations . . . in which such invocation does not signify an
intention to proceed in a court to the exclusion of arbitration.”).
183 Id. at 391 (enumerating possibilities and noting that they are not exhaustive).
184 Nicholas v. KBR, Inc., 565 F.3d 904, 908–09 (5th Cir. 2009).
181
182
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that arbitration has been waived, is per se wasteful. A rule like the
Seventh Circuit’s instead prevents gamesmanship because a party
cannot try its luck in a judicial forum and then invoke arbitration
when things go poorly, inflicting the resultant procedural costs on
the judicial system.185
But the Cabinetree rule—that a decision to proceed before a
nonarbitral tribunal raises a presumption of waiver—is too strong.
In a case that followed Cabinetree, the Seventh Circuit cabined its
doctrine, finding that a response does not raise a presumption of
waiver.186 This is only fair, since a party at such an early stage
should not have to run the risk of a default judgment while it decides
whether to litigate or arbitrate.187
Consistent with the underlying purposes of the FAA, and to
prevent litigative gamesmanship, courts should apply a two-tiered
analysis. Under the first tier, courts should automatically find
waiver where a party deliberately manipulates the judicial process
or gains an advantage it would not have gained in arbitration. For
example, a party might take advantage of courts’ broad discovery
rules to win a smoking-gun document, only to move for arbitration
once the party obtained the document. Under the second tier, courts
should rebuttably presume waiver where a party duplicates the
machinery of arbitration by litigating in court. This standard will
best ensure that the cost-saving function of the FAA is vindicated,
while giving parties an equitable outlet when they litigate in good
faith. A party might need to fend off an aggressor in litigation while
it weighs its options, or the party might have genuine doubts about
the arbitrability of its claim but need to file to meet a statute of
limitations. A party’s change in counsel could cut either way.
Of course, it is possible that the savings to the parties of
arbitration would be so great that, even where some costs are
duplicated by unnecessary litigation, arbitration would still result
in a net-savings to the parties and the judiciary. Still, if one party
has resisted a motion to compel arbitration, that resistance
185 See generally Lilly, supra note 145 (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit and arguing that
courts should rebuttably presume waiver where litigants fail to raise arbitration as a defense
at the pleading stage).
186 Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. Bombardier Recreational Prod., Inc., 660 F.3d 988, 995
(7th Cir. 2011).
187 See id. at 996 (noting that a party’s failure to participate in an appeal or mediation
would have caused a default judgment in the other party’s favor).
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probably shows that it expects litigation to provide the most value.
Asking a court to assess the savings to the parties by invoking
arbitration asks too much. Courts are in a better position to provide
a prophylactic rule that ensures parties will invoke their arbitral
rights at the earliest possible moment or be bound by their decision
to litigate.
To litigate with arbitration as a fallback is “like testing the water
before taking the swim. If it’s not to your liking you go elsewhere.”188
But litigating with arbitration as a fallback is not just an unfair
benefit to the party seeking arbitration; it also costs courts and
opposing parties who must entertain the litigation. Taxing courts
and parties in this way runs counter to the animating purposes of
the FAA—saving costs, clearing dockets, and inviting experts into
disputes. Courts should reconsider the burden of prejudice that
nonmovants must bear to show that arbitration has been waived.
Instead, courts should find waiver where a party deliberately plays
the two-venue system or wins an unfair advantage in litigation.
Courts should rebuttably presume waiver where a party’s conduct
shows intent to litigate. This rule would put courts on high alert for
parties trying to have it both ways.

188

McConnell v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 164 Cal. Rptr. 751, 754 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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